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THE POLITICS OF THE INCOME TAX 
Joseph Bankman * 
DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913. By Robert Stanley. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 331. $45. 
The modem state allocates wealth through public law, direct ex-
penditures, and administrative rulemaking. It is the power to tax, 
though, that offers the state its last and most promising means to affect 
the distribution of wealth. The state can reallocate wealth, not only 
through the tax rate structure, but also through tax incentives and 
disincentives that favor some sectors over others. In light of the per-
vasive distributional role of the tax law, one might expect that political 
theory would play an important role in tax scholarship. That, how-
ever, is not the case. Legal tax scholarship is generally written by for-
mer tax lawyers, aided by a handful of economists. Few legal tax 
scholars have advanced degrees or serious scholarly interests in his-
tory, political science, anthropology, or sociology. Consistent with 
their background and expertise, law professors who write on tax spend 
most of their time on two tasks. The first task is to provide intelligible 
descriptions of the increasingly complex tax law. The second task is to 
ferret out economically similar transactions that - often for no good 
reason - generate dissimilar tax consequences. An article written in 
the latter vein might point out that interest realized from money mar-
ket accounts is fully taxed, while "interest in disguise" realized 
through other investments is taxed at low effective rates or escapes tax 
altogether. 1 
At some level, of course, all writing is political. Legal scholars 
who have served in government and worked on tax legislation some-
times write of the broad political forces that affect such legislation.2 
Legal scholars who point out inconsistencies in the tax law often rec-
ommend ways in which the law ought to be changed, and those rec-
ommendations are often based on norms, such as efficiency or the so-
* Professor of Law and Helen L. Crocker Faculty Scholar, Stanford University. A.B. 1977, 
University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1980, Yale. - Ed. The author wishes to thank Barbara 
Fried David and David Linges for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
I. See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 
YALE L.J. 506 (1986). 
2. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Mandating Employer Health Coverage: The Big Mistake, 60 
TAX NOTES 1765 (1993); Michael J. Graetz, Revisiting the Income Tax vs. Consumption Tax 
Debate, 57 TAX NOTES 1437 (1992) (a politically savvy policy analysis by an academic who 
served as Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy in the Bush administration). 
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called Haig-Simons definition of income, that are laden with political 
content. Few legal scholars, however, wish to spend time analyzing 
the political dimensions of those norms or addressing in other ways 
the politics of the income tax. The following play little or no role in 
legal scholarship: data on the before- and after-tax distribution of 
wealth or the fluidity of that distribution over the individual life cycle 
or across generations; the writings of Locke, Bentham, or more mod-
em political theorists on the just distribution of wealth; and political, 
sociological, or anthropological studies of the attitudes of individuals 
toward the tax or expenditure side of government. Only recently has 
positive political theory, in the form of economics-influenced public 
choice theory, gained a serious foothold in legal tax scholarship.3 
The present focus of legal scholarship is not necessarily bad. The 
tax law is enormously complicated, and inconsistencies within the law 
that are not brought to light can cost the fisc billions of dollars and 
distort behavior in ways that are undesirable under any political the-
ory. Moreover, by focusing with increasing economic sophistication 
on the operation of the tax law, legal tax scholars are doing what they 
do best. One might therefore applaud a division of labor \lnder which 
legal tax scholars confine themselves to the nuts and bolts of the sys-
tem and leave it to those in the humanities and sociai sciences to pro-
vide insight into the larger political issues. 
Unfortunately, the same complexity that keeps legal scholars tied 
up with the technical side of the tax law has discouraged other schol-
ars from giving more than cursory attention to the tax system. In 
general, only economists have shown much interest in the politics of 
tax, and much of that interest has been evinced by the rather small 
3. Compare Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and 
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 926-62 (1987) (employing public 
choice theory to develop a contractual model of the tax legislative process in order to explain the 
increasing role of tax reform) and Barry L. Anderson, Student Paper, On the Likelihood of Sensi-
ble Tax Reform, 4 AM. J. TAX POLY. 81, 90-105 (1985) (discussing both the public interest and 
public choice models of the legislative process and the problems posed for meaningful tax re-
form) with Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative 
Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 64-111 (1990) 
(arguing that Doemberg and McChesney ignore the symbolic importance oflegislation to voters, 
legislators' ideology, and other factors); Karla W. Simon, Tax Simplification and Justice, 36 TAX 
NOTES 93, 99-100 (1987) (noting that models of tax policy legislative processes must recognize 
the difficulty of drawing the line between the public interest and a special interest) and Edward 
A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax 
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1166 (1993) (arguing that tax subsidies 
are often better mechanisms than direct expenditures because tax institutions "are less suscepti-
ble to interest group capture and possess greater legitimacy"). 
For works examining problems with tax reform written prior to the popular rise of public 
choice scholarship in law, see generally JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (1977); 
and Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get 
Enacted, 10 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1957). 
For a discussion and critique of public choice theory, see generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip 
P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987); Symposium on the 
Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988). 
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group of economists who have served in government and worked on 
tax legislation.4 Excluding the contributions of this group and a smat-
tering of works produced by policy institutions such as the Brookings 
Institute, it is perhaps fair to say that the politics of the income tax has 
been the subject of only one modern book-length study - John F. 
Witte's The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax. 5 
Witte provides in a single book much of what one might mean by the 
political study of the income tax. Witte reviews prescriptive theories 
of taxation, the changing public attitudes toward tax, the probable 
economic effect that income tax has on the distribution of wealth, and 
the politics leading up to major developments in the tax law. 
Witte concludes - contrary to the findings of more cynical public 
choice theorists - that our tax system reflects popular will, or at least 
popular will as shaped by the pressures of pluralist politics. Accord-
ing to Witte, legislative deviations from a neutral income tax (tax ex-
penditures) seldom inure to narrowly defined, wealthy special interest 
groups. Instead, "in terms of revenue, the tax expenditures that count 
are those with widely endorsed and solid justifications, long histories, 
and large potential constituencies," such as the nontaxation of em-
ployer-provided health insurance. 6 As far as the effects of the tax law 
on the distribution of wealth, Witte finds that the law is about as pro-
gressive as public opinion polls show the voters desire. 7 
Given the paucity of writing in this area, one welcomes the addi-
tion of a new, full-length book on the politics of the income tax: Rob-
ert Stanley's Dimensions of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the 
Federal Income Tax, 1861-1913,8 published last year by Oxford Uni-
versity Press. Stanley's book mirrors the structure of Witte's: both 
books examine the cause and effects of tax legislation and offer per-
spectives on the state of current tax law. In tone and substance, how-
ever, it is hard to imagine two more dissimilar scholarly efforts. 
Stanley is both a lawyer and a historian, and his work shows the 
mark of scholarship in both fields. In law, Stanley has been influenced 
by the critical legal studies movement, and he takes from that move-
4. In general, the scholarship produced by this group of policymaking economists has been 
quite good. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); c. EU-
GENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE (1992). 
5. JOHN F. WllTE, THE PoLmcs AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
(1985). 
6. Id. at 285-88. 
7. Id. at 360. The fact that the law mirrors public desire does not mean, to Witte, that all is 
well with the income tax. The political sway oflarge, organized constituencies precludes the type 
of "pure" income tax Witte himself favors - a broad-based comprehensive income tax with few 
or no exceptions. Witte sees in the present tax a patchwork of exceptions that threatens the 
ability of the government to raise revenue, raises compliance costs, and retards any hopes that 
the law may be used to redistribute significant amounts of wealth someday. Id. at 59-63, 369-79. 
8. Robert Stanley is Associate Professor of Political Science, California State University, 
Chico. 
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ment the belief that the function of legal doctrine and reform is often 
symbolic rather than substantive. Stanley does not subscribe to other 
beliefs often associated with critical legal studies, such as the belief 
that law is radically indeterminate. In history, Stanley follows in the 
path of Gabriel Kolko, James Weinstein, Theda Skocpol, and others 
who offer a revisionist - though by now somewhat established -
view that the ostensible reforms of the Progressive Era had little sub-
stance and are best described as shields used to deflect attacks on the 
prevailing order.9 
Stanley argues at the outset of Law in the Service of Order that the 
few scholars who write on the income tax have taken a Panglossian 
view of their subject (p. 3). By and large, Stanley argues, the income 
tax has been seen as the electorate's civic-minded attempt to bring 
about a modicum of economic justice. For the generation of scholars 
writing before 1950, that view was part of a broader conception of 
Progressive-Era politics as a triumph of reform over plutocracy. For a 
more recent generation of pluralist scholars, that view represents an 
exception to the conception of the state as a "bumptious set" of con-
tending special interest groups (p. 8). 
Stanley's own view of the income tax is considerably darker. The 
central thesis of Law in the Service of Order is that the income tax was 
adopted to shore up the position of statist or centrist capitalists - a 
loose, and unfortunately ill-defined, group consisting at its core of the 
wealthy and of members of an activist state. The purpose of the tax 
was to sap the strength of the left with the rhetoric rather than the 
reality of economic justice, and in that purpose the tax was successful 
(pp. 13-14). 
Stanley's book is organized chronologically around the major de-
velopments during the period of his study. In support of his thesis, 
Stanley presents substantial evidence that the income tax was the 
brainchild of the establishment. The tax was introduced and - after 
various setbacks - reintroduced by centrist politicians. Unlike the 
inheritance tax, the income tax was not a major goal of the left. 10 In-
deed, at one point the tax was most vociferously supported by con-
servative political economists, who saw a single-rate income tax as a 
benign alternative to the constant state intermeddling inherent in the 
complex and ever-changing tariff system. Consistent with his belief 
9. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CoNSERVATISM (1963); JAMES WEINSTEIN, 
THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1968); Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State 
Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 3 (Peter 
B. Evans et al. eds., 1985); Theda Skocpol, The Limits of the New Deal Systems and the Roots of 
Contemporary Welfare Dilemmas, in THE PoLmcs OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
293 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988). See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressiv-
ism, REVIEWS AM. HIST., Dec. 1982, at 113. 
10. For a contrary view of the importance placed on the income tax by the left, see JAMES T. 
KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EURO-
PEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 355 (1986). 
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that it is the rhetoric, rather than the actual effect, of the tax that is 
significant, Stanley focuses considerable attention on the language 
used by participants in the tax debates and the way in which the tax 
was portrayed in the popular media. Law in the Service of Order is 
studded with quotations from speeches and writings of nineteenth-
century politicians and commentators. This, together with the ambi-
tious nature of Stanley's enterprise and the counterintuitive nature of 
some of the facts he has unearthed, makes Law in the Service of Order 
a good read. 
Unfortunately, Stanley is ultimately unsuccessful in persuading at 
least this reader of the merit of his central thesis: that the political 
history of the income tax is best understood as the wealthy co-opting 
both the left and the less-privileged classes through the rhetoric of re-
form. Stanley's account persuasively establishes that the federal in-
come tax at most effected, and effects, a moderate redistribution of 
wealth - a description few would dispute. But whether, as Stanley 
claims, there is a huge gap between that "incarnate historical reality" 
and the "apparently democratic promise of income taxation" (p. 4) 
that needs explaining depehds, in the first instance, on what one takes 
that "apparent democratic promise" to be. Stanley's own answer -
resting on a complicated set of factual and normative premises not 
always well developed - is that the tax ought to have been, and ought 
to be, progressive enough to alter significantly the distribution of 
wealth; that the left and the masses shared that position; and that the 
rhetoric of the tax's supporters deliberately misled them into believing 
that the tax would achieve the goal of equitable distribution (pp. 13-
14). Granting his premises, it is hardly surprising that Stanley con-
cludes the tax was, and is, little more than a sham to distract the non-
privileged classes from their true goals. 
Each of those premises is, however, at best debatable. Consider, 
for example, the first modem income tax, adopted in 1862 and allowed 
to expire a decade later. Stanley begins his analysis of this tax with a 
long excerpt of a speech given by one of its chief supporters, Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman John Sherman. In the typical grandilo-
quent style of the age, Sherman argued that the tax was necessary to 
redress the injustice of the regressive tariff system: 
We tax the tea, the coffee, the sugar, the spices the poor man uses. 
We tax every little thing that is imported from abroad, together with the 
whiskey that makes him drunk and the beer that cheers him and the 
tobacco that consoles him. Everything that he consumes we call a lux-
ury and tax it; yet we are afraid to touch the income of Mr. Astor. Is 
there any justice in that?ll 
Sherman went on to give other justifications for the tax. It was 
supported by historical precedent, did not seriously threaten the sys-
11. P. 19 (citing CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4715 (1870)). 
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tern of private property, and, finally, was necessary to quiet the 
masses: "[Y]ou will hear clamor coming from the mass of the people 
who will complain of injustice and wrong, and their voice, although 
not often heard in the way of petitions, when it comes to you is more 
mighty than the waves of the sea."12 
In his exegesis of the passage, in a chapter entitled "Forestalling 
the 'Popular Clamor,' " Stanley concludes that it is the last of Sher-
man's two arguments that captures the true purpose behind the adop-
tion of the tax: to quiet dissent without relinquishing the privileges of 
the existing order (pp. 15-58). As an exercise in internal textual inter-
pretation, Stanley's reading seems at least contestable. Perhaps in us-
ing a metaphor in the close of his speech, to link the voice of the 
masses to the swelling of the sea, Sherman meant to imbue the position 
of the former group with the majesty of the latter force and to suggest 
that the injustice of the existing law constituted a sin against nature. 
More importantly, there is no obvious internal reason to privilege the 
last part of the speech, whatever its interpretation, over the first part of 
the speech, in which Sherman offered a seemingly heartfelt description 
of the need to relieve the poor of excessive taxation. Stanley offers no 
other significant evidence as to Sherman's motivation and virtually no 
evidence as to the motivation of anyone other than Sherman. 
Stanley shows that the Civil War tax did not appreciably change 
the distribution of wealth. High exemption levels removed tax liability 
for all but about one percent of the population (p. 40), the tax rate 
never exceeded ten percent (p. 41), and the tax never raised more than 
nineteen percent of revenue (p. 42). Given the more limited goals set 
forth by Sherman, however, the tax was successful: by raising addi-
tional revenue through an income tax paid only by the very wealthy 
rather than a regressive tariff, the tax significantly changed the 
progressivity of the tax system. 
A key element of Stanley's thesis is that the rhetoric rather than 
substance of the income tax helped forestall dissent. Stanley presents 
no evidence, however, to suggest that the public perceived the income 
tax to be anything other than it was. Congress passed the tax during 
the Civil War as a means of funding the war. It seems unlikely that 
the masses saw redistribution of wealth as an intended purpose or 
probable effect of the tax. 
For the most part, Stanley's analysis of the role of the income tax 
during the half century following the Civil War is subject to the same 
criticism. The tax measures passed in 1894 and 1913 never seriously 
affected the distribution of private wealth; however, again due to high 
exemption levels, the taxes were quite progressive and were large 
enough, relative to other taxes, to alter the distribution of the aggre-
12. P. 22 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 4lst Cong., 2d Sess. 4716 (1870)). 
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gate tax burden. Again, Stanley presents relatively little evidence of 
legislative intent or the way in which the taxes were perceived by the 
left or the poor. 
As its subtitle suggests, Law in the Service of Order concentrates on 
the development of the incoine tax prior to World War I. In the last 
chapter, however, Stanley brings his analysis up to the present day 
(pp. 248-57). Stanley acknowledges that, during this century, the in-
come tax has grown to have an increasingly large economic impact 
and a smaller symbolic or rhetorical role. However, Stanley still finds 
the tax law insufficiently redistributive, and, once again, he places the 
blame on the influence of centrism. According to Stanley, "the course 
of the modem tax reflects the same processes that originated it: the 
centrist use . . . to preserve, rather than to change, the conditions of 
power" (p. 256). "[T]he best explanation of modem income taxation 
and its relationship to the organization of wealth and opportunity," 
writes Stanley, "is not that an apparently pluralist system has consist-
ently failed in its efforts toward long-term reform, but, rather, that a 
genuinely centrist system has consistently succeeded in preventing it" 
(p. 257). 
It is difficult, from these and other statements, to understand the 
method by which Stanley believes centrism has succeeded in thwarting 
reform. Perhaps Stanley believes the rhetorical dimension in tax, 
while diminished, is still present and that this dimension misleads vot-
ers and prevents reform. If this is Stanley's argument, one wonders 
what he makes of the evidence, cited by Witte, 13 that the tax law re-
flects public desires and that the law is as progressive in actual effect as 
the public wishes. At one point, Stanley suggests that the public un-
derstands and approves of the present tax law, but only because it has 
been misled into doing so.14 The tax law, in other words, is now the 
product rather than the cause of false consciousness. Unfortunately, 
Stanley does not develop this argument in any detail. 
Stanley's book is animated in part by his belief that the tax law 
ought to have been and ought now to be more progressive than it is. 
At no point in his book, though, does Stanley explicitly argue the mer-
its of that animating belief. Instead, Law in the Service of Order sup-
ports the goal of greater redistribution indirectly, by impugning the 
process by which we arrived at our present rate structure. One can 
hardly blame Stanley for using the tools at his disposal to address the 
issue. Ultimately, though, one suspects that the case for a more redis-
tributive tax-transfer system is better argued as a matter of policy 
rather than process. Such an argument might begin with a portrait of 
the existing distribution of wealth. One could not hope to provide 
13. See Wrrra, supra note 5, at 339-64. 
14. Pp. 250-57 (suggesting that the modern income tax has lost much of its symbolic func· 
tion and that federal entitlement programs have assumed that role). 
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such a portrait without taking sides in numerous debates within the 
relevant literature. There is no debate, however, over the proposition 
that, as an absolute measure and relative to other developed nations, 
there is a wide gap between the wealthy and the poor in this country. ts 
Moreover, there is no significant trend in the past fifteen years toward 
a more equal distribution of national wealth. t6 
One might then attempt to articulate more formally the moral the-
ories or intuitions that underlie our unease with the present distribu-
tion of wealth. In the past, those who have argued for redistribution, 
including this reviewer, have relied on welfarist theories of justice.t7 
These theories assume a dollar is more valuable to the poor than the 
wealthy; they assume redistribution reduces the misery of the poor 
and, notwithstanding the fact that the wealthy are worse off, increases 
social welfare. One might instead approach the issue through various 
equality-based theories of justice, focusing perhaps on the relationship 
between the distribution of wealth and the desiderate of equal oppor-
tunity or equal access to basic goods. ts 
Finally, one might examine the role of the tax system in redistrib-
uting wealth. High tax rates reduce savings and work effort, though 
commentators often overstate the extent of this reduction.t9 It may be 
better, perhaps, to have healthy but proportionate taxes and transfer 
programs aimed directly at the poor than to return to the days of high 
progressive rates.20 
No single scholar could hope to do original work on the three 
rather disparate elements of the argument outlined above, and it is 
foolish to think that Stanley should have defined his enterprise to in-
clude any of those arguments. Until the question of progressivity is 
addressed head on, however, indirect attacks on the present system, no 
matter how well documented, are unlikely to have much effect, even 
by the attenuated standards by which one measures the effect of schol-
arly works. 
Notwithstanding its somewhat peculiar take on the issue and the 
evident problems with its thesis, Law in the Service of Order is a valua-
ble contribution to the literature. Stanley has a good story to tell and 
15. See generally AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); UNEVEN TIDES: R.Is-
ING INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993). 
16. Indeed, most scholars have found the opposite to be the case. See supra note 15. For a 
slightly more optimistic view of recent trends, see David Wessel, The Outlook: Rise in Inequality 
Shows Signs of Slowing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1992, at Al. 
17. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look at Progressive Taxation, 15 CAL. L. REv. 1905 (1987). 
18. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-95 (1971) (arguing that principles of 
fair equality of opportunity and pure procedural justice demand that all individuals maintain 
equal access to certain "primary social goods"). 
19. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 17, at 1919-25 (discussing studies oflabor elasticity). 
20. Id. at 1966-67 (advocating a combination of fiat marginal rates and transfer payments). 
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tells it well. One is continually struck by the author's erudition and 
intelligence. Finally, in emphasizing the importance of rhetoric in the 
politics of tax, Stanley has hit upon a subject ripe for analysis. One 
does not have to agree with Stanley that the public is fooled by the 
rhetoric of tax to think it useful to examine the political discourse sur-
rounding the tax law. Suppose, instead, one adopts Witte's more be-
nign vision that politicians offer the public what they believe the public 
wants. In that case, the rhetoric of tax can serve as a window from 
which to view the public attitude toward the creation and allocation of 
wealth. One thinks in this connection of the most recent presidential 
election. All three candidates made tax reform a central part of their 
campaign and then proceeded to release tax proposals that could not 
possibly accomplish their stated objectives and struck many knowl-
edgeable observers as preposterous.21 What the proposals had in com-
mon was their high symbolic content and their appeal to popular myth 
and prejudice. Recall the attention given to enterprise or empower-
ment zones or the claims made concerning tax evasion by foreign com-
panies operating in the United States. Careful analysis of the rhetoric 
of the campaign might give us some insight into the current tax law. 
In any event, given the lack of substance in today's political discourse, 
what else can one study but the rhetoric of the debate? 
21. See, e.g., Alan Murray, Clintonomics: Democrat's Plan Relies on Public Spending to Spur 
Investment, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1991, at Al (detailing the reactions of various economists and 
policymakers to the tax reform proposals of Clinton, Bush, and Perot). 
